In an operation carried out by Mexican armed forces in the municipality of Tapalpa, Jalisco, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho,” leader of the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and one of the drug traffickers most wanted by Mexico and the United States, was killed. A reward of up to 15 million dollars had been offered by Washington for information leading to his capture. After more than a decade evading security operations, the CJNG leader died from injuries sustained during a confrontation with the Mexican Army.

Oseguera Cervantes’ death represents a significant blow to one of the country’s most violent and expansive criminal organizations. Founded around 2009, the CJNG managed to position itself as a dominant actor in international drug trafficking alongside the Cártel de Sinaloa. According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the CJNG has dominant presence in 23 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities and estimated assets exceeding 20 billion dollars, reflecting remarkable financial capacity and territorial expansion (START 2023).

Beyond its territorial footprint, the CJNG stands out for its organizational scale. According to Prieto-Curiel, Campedelli, and Hope (2023), the cartel had an estimated size of approximately 28,764 members in 2022, within a range of 28,600 to 33,100 members. This estimate derives from a dynamic model calibrated with homicide, disappearance, and arrest data, making it one of the most robust quantitative exercises for assessing the operational capacity of criminal groups in Mexico.

Given this, the operation has a number of implications, both for organized crime and internationally, as discussed below.

Organizational Architecture and Expansion Model

Recent studies indicate that the CJNG’s alliance structure is hierarchical and top-down, with a clear and centralized chain of command (Jones et al. 2022). This architecture facilitates strategic control, operational discipline, and territorial coordination.

The CJNG has also been described as operating under a franchise-type model, combining centralized direction with the incorporation of less-experienced local criminal actors who operate under its brand and supervision (Jones et al. 2022, p. 79). This design has enabled accelerated expansion and the absorption of regional criminal structures.

However, hierarchically organized groups tend to fragment when key leaders are neutralized (Jones et al. 2022, p. 77). Decapitation strategies may weaken the apex but can also produce the proliferation of autonomous cells with lower strategic cohesion and a greater propensity for predatory violence.

Criminal Governance: Fear, Provision of Goods, and “Philanthropy”

Beyond its structure, the CJNG has developed sophisticated mechanisms of criminal governance. Sampó, Jenne, and Ferreira (2023) argue that its exercise of illicit rule rests primarily on three elements:

1. Fear, derived from the high levels of violence deployed in territories under its control.
2. Provision of public goods, mainly security, as a form of instrumental legitimation vis-à-vis local communities.
3. Provision of specific goods, including what the authors describe as acts of “criminal philanthropy” (p. 658) in strategic areas.

This hybrid model—violent coercion combined with selective provision of goods—contributes to the consolidation of territorial enclaves where the cartel not only competes with the state but partially substitutes governance functions.

Implications of the Death of “El Mencho”

If the CJNG combines hierarchical structure, a franchise model, and territorial criminal governance, the removal of its leader may generate ambiguous effects. For example, it could weaken central coordination and erode internal cohesion. Additionally, given its organizational scale and expansive structure, it could incentivize fragmentation and decentralized violence (Jones et al., 2022).

In contexts of institutional weakness, these fragmented cells may intensify extortion, expand into legal markets, and consolidate more diffuse yet persistent criminal enclaves (Jones et al. 2022, p. 79). The estimated magnitude of the CJNG—close to thirty thousand members—suggests that its resilience does not depend exclusively on individual leadership (Prieto-Curiel, Campedelli, & Hope, 2023).